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Corruption  is  popularly  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  serious  obstacles  to
development.  Recent  econometric  studies  show  that  indicators  of  corruption  are
negatively  correlated  with  important  economic  outcomes.  Mauro  (1995)  and  Burki
and  Perry  (1998) claim that corruption  reduces  economic  growth,  via reduced  private
investment;  Kaufman  et al (1999) find that corruption  limits development  (per capita
income,  child  mortality,  and literacy);  and Bai and  Wei (2000) argue that  corruption
affects  the  making  of  economic  policy.  Even  though  specific  methodologies  may
raise  doubts  about  issues of causation,  it is true that  corruption  is indeed  negatively
correlated  with  several  crucial  economic  variables  and,  despite  the  presence  of
feedbacks,  corruption  seems  to  have  independent  effects  of its own.  Consequently,
there  is a real economic  return to understanding  and fighting  corruption.
This  study  examines  empirically  the  determinants  of  corruption,  paying
particular  attention  to  political  institutions  that  help  determine  the  extent  to  which
policymakers  can be held accountable  for the actions  of their staff. Previous  empirical
studies  have  not analyzed  the role of political  institutions,  even though  both  political
science  and economics  theoretical  literatures  have  indicated  their importance.  One of
the  main contributions  of this paper  is to show that the role of political  institutions  is
indeed  extremely  important,  and  eclipses  the  effects  of  some  variables  that  have
received  considerable  attention  in the  previous  empirical  literature.  In addition,  this
study uses  a panel  data set, which  is also new in the literature.
The  main  theoretical  hypothesis  guiding  our  empirical  investigation  is  that
political  institutions  affect  corruption  through  two  channels:  political  accountability
and  the  structure  of  provision  of  public  goods.  Political  mechanisms  that  increase
political  accountability,  either  by  encouraging  punishment  of corrupt  individuals  or
by  reducing  the  informational  problem  related  to  government  activities,  tend  to
reduce  the  incidence  of  corruption.  Also,  institutions  generating  a  competitive
environment  in the provision  of public  services tend  to reduce the extraction  of rents,
therefore  reducing  corruption.
3The results show that political institutions seem to be extremely important in
determining the  prevalence  of  corruption.  In  short,  democracies,  parliamentary
systems, political  stability, and  freedom of  press  are  all  associated  with  lower
corruption. Additionally, we show that common results of the previous empirical
literature on the determinants of corruption - related to openness and legal tradition -
do not hold once political variables are taken into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the nature of
corruption by, first, distinguishing corruption from other types of crimes, and, second,
by characterizing corruption as a political phenomenon. Section 3 presents the data on
corruption, discusses its potential limitations, and describes the empirical approach
and selected variables. Section 4 discusses the specification of the model and the
results. Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing its main contributions to the
empirical literature on the determinants of corruption.
2 The Nature of Corruption
2.1 Corruption as a Crime
There is no question that corruption is, before anything else, a type of crime.
Therefore,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  factors  determining the  incidence  of
common crimes should also play an important role in determining the incidence of
corruption, thus  making corruption  and other types  of  crimes  highly correlated.
Surprisingly enough, this is not  the case. While the different types  of "common"
crimes  are  highly  correlated across  countries, none  of  the  common  crimes  are
significantly correlated with  corruption. Table  1 shows the pair-wise  correlation
between crime rates, taken from the International Crime Victimization Surveys, and a
corruption index,  taken  from  the  International Country  Risk  Guide,  which  are
discussed in section 3 below. While the pair-wise correlations among rates of thefts,
burglaries, and contact crimes are all positive  and significant at the  1% level -
ranging from 0.55 to 0.76 - the correlations among the corruption index and the crime
rates are quite small and never significant, being even negative for thefts.
4Table 1: Correlation Between a Corruption Index and Crime Rates
Corruption  Burglary  Theft  Cont.  crimes
Corruption  I
Burglary  0.12  1
42
Theft  -0.12  0.58*  1
42  45
Cont.  crimes  0.22  0.76*  0.55*  1
42  45  45
Notes: *  - Significant at 1%. Number of observations below the correlations.
Corruption index from the ICRG, 1999. Crime rates from ICVS, average for
all years available.
This evidence suggests that factors distinguishing corruption from the other
crimes, related precisely to  its connections to  government activities and authority,
play an important role, which makes corruption a different phenomenon with its own
characteristics and determinants. This was noticed as long ago as 1907, when Francis
McGovern (1907, p266) wrote that
"Its  [corruption's] advent  in  any  community  is  marked  by  the
commission of bribery, extortion and criminal conspiracies to defraud
the public, without a corresponding increase in other unrelated crimes.
Its going, likewise, is accompanied by no abatement in the usual grist
of larcenies, burglaries and murder. It is, indeed, a unique and highly
complex thing; an institution, if you please, rather than a condition of
society or a temper or tendency of any class of individuals."
To  analyze the determinants of  corruption, thus,  we  have to  concentrate
precisely  on  its  "institutional" features. The political  dimension of  this  point  is
immediately obvious. Political institutions, by determining the environment in which
the relations between individuals and the state take place, are extremely important in
determining the incidence of corruption. Ultimately, the political macrostructure -
related to the political system, balance of powers, electoral competition, and so on -
determines the incentives for those in office to be honest, and to police and punish
5misbehavior of others, such that the effects are propagated throughout the system to
the lower levels of government.
2.2 The Political Determinants  of Corruption
The theoretical literature on the determinants of corruption has experienced a
boom in the last decades, accompanying the increased interest in the topic in the
media. A large part of this  literature has  concentrated on the impact of different
institutional designs on corruption levels and on the political nature of corruption.
Here, we selectively review this literature, with the goal of setting up a theoretical
background to guide our empirical investigation. A broad review of the literature on
corruption is contained in Bardhan (1997).
The  problem  of  corruption  in  the  public  sphere  is  almost  a  natural
consequence of  the  nature  of government  interventions. Transactions within  the
government  always  imply  some  asymmetry  of  information between  the  parts
involved, and governments intervene precisely in situations where there are market
failures, such that private provision is not a good alternative (Banerjee, 1997). In this
context, corruption arises spontaneously as a consequence of the existence of rents
and monitoring failures. The possibility of rent extraction and the precise nature of
the informational problem depend on the political institutions, which determine the
incentives facing individuals dealing with  and  within the state. Ultimately, these
determine  the  responses  of  the  political  actors  to  corruption,  and,  thus,  the
equilibrium level of corruption.
These effects of political institutions on corruption work mainly through two
channels. The first one is related to political accountability: any mechanisms that
increase  political  accountability,  either  by  encouraging  punishment  of  corrupt
individuals or by reducing the informational problem related to government activities,
tends to reduce the incidence of corruption. The other one is related to the structure of
provision of public goods: institutions generating a competitive environment in the
provision of the same public service tend to reduce the extraction of rents, therefore
reducing corruption via a  straightforward economic competition mechanism. The
following discussion further explores these two points.
6Political Accountability and Corruption
The political science and economics literatures have extensively discussed the
role  of  political  accountability  in  generating  good  governance  practices,  and,
particularly, in reducing corruption (see, for example, Fackler and Lin, 1995; Linz
and Stepan, 1996; Nas et al, 1996; Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997; Persson et al, 1997;
Rose-Ackerman,  1999; Djankov et al, 2001; and Laffont and  Meleu, 2001). The
central argument is that accountability allows for the punishment of politicians that
adopt  "bad  policies,"  thus  aligning  politicians'  preferences  with  those  of  the
electorate. The degree of accountability in the system is determined, in turn, by the
specific features of the political system. Three main features can be identified in this
respect: the degree of competition in the political system, the existence of checks and
balances mechanisms across different branches of government, and the transparency
of the system.
The first  point - political competition - has  long been recognized as  an
important factor determining the efficiency of political outcomes (Downs, 1957). In
brief, the simple existence of fair elections guarantees that politicians can, to some
extent, be held liable to the actions taken while in public office (Linz and Stepan,
1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Any institution that strengthens the harm imposed on
politicians by the loss of elections will, therefore, enhance the force of this reward
mechanism to  control  politicians'  behavior. Rules  (or  institutions) that  lengthen
politicians' time horizons increase the force of elections as a reward device. The more
the system biases politicians toward long-term goals, the higher are their incentives to
stick to good governance. For example, political systems that allow for executive re-
elections, or that make parties relatively stronger vis-a-vis candidates, should have
fewer myopic politicians, and, therefore, less corruption (Linz, 1990; Linz and Stepa,
1996; Bailey and Valenzuela 1997; and Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
The second point relates to the existence of checks and balances mechanisms
across  different branches  of  power.  Generally  speaking,  separation  of  powers,
together with checks and balances mechanisms and the right incentives design, help
prevent abuses of power, with different government bodies disciplining each other in
7the citizens' favor (McGovern, 1907; Persson et al, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and
Laffont  and  Meleu, 2001).  This  can be  true  regarding the relations  among the
executive, legislative, and judiciary powers, and also regarding the relations among
different levels of the executive power. For example, parliamentary systems allow for
a stronger and more immediate monitoring of the executive by the legislature, which
should increase accountability and, therefore, reduce corruption (Linz, 1990; Linz and
Stepan, 1996; Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997). As long as it is not in the interest of one
of the government branches to collude with the other branches, separation of powers
creates mechanisms to police and punish government officials that misbehave, thus
reducing the equilibrium level of corruption. Moreover, developing adequate checks
and balances for particular contexts may take time, either as a result of an institutional
learning process  or because of  some inertial feature of corruption (Tirole,  1996;
Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997; and Treisman 2000). Political stability, in this case, is
also  an  important  factor  determining the  efficacy  of  the  checks  and  balances
mechanisms and the level of corruption.
The  final  point  is  related  to  transparency,  which  also  increases  the
accountability in the system. Transparency depends crucially on the freedom of press
and expression, and on the degree of centralization in the system. Freedom of press,
so that right- and wrong-doings on the part of the government can be publicized,
tends to reduce the informational problem between principals (citizens) and agents
(governments), thus  improving governance and,  particularly, reducing corruption
(Fackler and Lin, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and Djankov et al, 2001). Evidence
on the real importance of freedom of press for political outcomes is presented, for
example, in Peters and Welch (1980), Fackler and Lin (1995), Giglioli (1996), and
Djankov et al (2001). Transparency can also be affected by decentralization, since
informational problems are smaller at the local level, which makes monitoring easier.
Smaller  constituencies facilitate  the  monitoring  of  the  performance of  elected
representatives and  public officials, and  additionally reduce the  collective action
problems related to political participation. Thus, in this sense, decentralized political
systems tend to have stronger accountability mechanisms and lower corruption (Nas
et al, 1996; and Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
8Structure  of Provision  of Public  Goods
Corruption usually represents the extraction of  a rent by someone who is
vested with some form of public power. The political structure, besides determining
the  incentives  for  politicians  to  fight  corruption,  also  determines  the  "market
structure" of the provision of public goods, which determines the capacity of public
officials to  extract rents from citizens. These are constraints that the institutional
design of the government imposes on officials and that affect the level of corruption
in a strictly economic way, which is equivalent to the effect of market structure on
price in a given industry.'
When several government agencies provide exactly the same service, and
citizens can freely choose where to purchase it, competition among agencies will
reduce corruption. In the limit, competition may drive corruption to  zero, just  as
perfect competition among firms drives price to marginal cost. This is the case of
different bureaucracies providing substitute services, and without any control over
each other or over the services provided by each other (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993;
and Weingast, 1995).
The  other  extreme  is  when  different  government  agencies  provide
complementary services. This occurs, for example, when different licenses have to be
obtained to perform the same job, or different spheres legislate over the same activity.
In this case, power is shared among different bureaucracies that extract rents from the
same  single source,  without taking  into  account its  effects on  the  others.  This
institutional set up increases corruption and the inefficiency of the system (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993).
These two structures can be associated with different types of decentralization
of power.  The first  one  refers  to  situations where,  for example,  several offices
compete to issue the same license, so that each agency has lower monopoly power
over "license emissions", and, thus, corruption is lower. In its more intricate form,
competition among public  services providers refers to  situations where  different
agencies compete for the same citizens or factors of production, and therefore their
Therefore, the term "industrial organization of corruption" sometimes applies to this kind of analysis.
9ability to extract rents is reduced by the possibility of migration of these constituents
to  other jurisdictions.  The  second  structure, characterized by  different  agencies
providing  complementary  services,  can  be  produced  by  decentralization when
different spheres of government are able to impose additional legislation on areas
already legislated by each other, thus increasing the number of bureaucracies that
citizens have to deal with to obtain a certain service. 2
Decentralization will thus reduce corruption as long as power is decentralized
into units that  can substitute (or compete with)  one another and that do not have
overlapping responsibilities. In practice, political decentralization, in the sense of
enhancing the autonomy of local (or provincial) governments, tends to bring together
these two effects. On the one hand, it increases the ability of states to compete against
each other for citizens, and, on the other hand, it allows states to increase regulation
over areas already covered by the central government. Which effect predominates is
an empirical question.
Existing Empirical  Evidence
The goal of this paper is to analyze how important these political institutions
are in determining perceived corruption. The point of departure is that the political
macrostructure determines the incentives facing politicians and high-level officials,
and their  reaction to  these incentives propagates the effects throughout the lower
levels of governrnent. The incentives are, therefore, reflected on the behavior of all
those who represent the state.
This question has not been analyzed by the existing empirical literature on the
determinants of  corruption. This  literature can be  divided into two  strands. One
correlates corruption with a large set of variables, and searches for the significant
2As  pointed out by Ahlin (2001), this  apparent contradiction in results does not really indicate a
theoretical indeterminacy in relation to the effects of decentralization on corruption. It indicates that
different types of  political decentralization will have different effects on corruption. This point is
implicit in the discussion in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and is explicitly analyzed in Ahlin (2001). In
brief,  political  decentralization  meaning  that  different  bureaucracies/politicians compete  for  the
provision of the same "good" to citizens - be it a license or a place to live and work - will lead to
lower  corruption;  and  political  decentralization  meaning  that  different  bureaucracies  provide
complementary goods - such as different agencies overlapping in the regulation of the same activity -
will lead to higher corruption.
10coefficients, as in Treisman (2000). The other strand looks at specific policies and
analyzes  their  effects  on  corruption.  These  analyses  of  the  more  proximate
determinants of corruption have mostly concentrated on the effects of relative public
wages (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001) and trade policies (Ades and di Tella,
1994; Laffont and N'Guessan, 1999).
None of these studies have asked the question that we propose here, and none
have analyzed the role of political variables. 3 The main contribution of this paper is
its search for the ultimate determinants of corruption, in the form of the political
institutions that determine specific policies as well as political outcomes.
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Indicators of Corruption
The greatest problem in the empirical analysis of corruption is the fact that,
for obvious reasons, there is no directly observable indicator. Any study of the subject
inevitably relies on some sort of survey. This would not be a problem if objective
data, such as from victimization surveys, were widely available. But victimization
surveys related to corruption are not so widespread as to allow the analysis of cross-
country variations in the incidence of corruption. Hence, existing studies rely on
subjective evaluation surveys, based on opinions of international businessmen, of
countries' citizens themselves, or of experts on country risk analysis.
In spite of their weakness, these subjective indicators have several positive
features. First, the results from surveys with very different methodologies are highly
correlated. This point is discussed in some detail in Treisman (2000), who explores
the correlation among several corruption indices. In Table 2, we follow his strategy
and  calculate the  pair  wise  correlation  among a  somewhat different  group  of
corruption indices for 1998.
3We  use one core variable  that also appears in Treisman  (2000),  but our interpretation  is quite
different.
11Table 2: Correlation Among Different Corruption Indices
ICRG  WDR  GALLUP  GCS I  GCS2  CRR-DRI
ICRG  I
WDR  0.58*  1
65
GALLUP  0.71*  0.72*  1
43  25
GCSI  0.64*  0.78*  0.78*  1
75  44  35
GCS2  0.64*  0.75*  0.83*  0.90*  1
53  31  33  53
CRR-DRI  0.63*  0.75*  0.70*  0.81*  0.79*  1
100  57  41  64  51
Notes:  *  - Significant at  1%. Number of observations below the correlations. Indices refer to  1998;
definitions contained in the Appendix.
These indices can be briefly described as follows: the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) measures corruption in the political system as a threat to foreign
investment; the  World Development Report (WDR)  measures corruption  as  an
obstacle to business; the GALLUP measures the frequency of cases of corruption
among public officials; the Global Competitiveness Survey (GCS) indices measure,
respectively, the frequency of irregular payments connected with imports, exports,
business licenses, police protection, loan applications, etc (GCS1), and the frequency
of irregular payments to officials and judiciary (GCS2); and the Country Risk Review
(CRR-DRI)  measures  corruption  among  public  officials  and  effectiveness  of
anticorruption initiatives. A more detailed description of these indices is contained in
the Appendix.
All the correlations are positive and significant at 1%, and with one exception
they are  all  above 0.6.  The table  suggests that  the  different indices  are  indeed
measuring something very similar. But in regard to exactly what they are measuring,
there is nevertheless the possibility that all the methodologies share the same bias.
This  could be the  case if the bias  is caused by the use  of subjective evaluation
methodologies. Since opinions  expressed about corruption can be  influenced, for
example, by the overall economic perfonnance  of a  specific country, the indices
could be partly capturing economic outcomes rather than corruption. Fortunately, this
does not seem to be the case. The correlation between the ICRG corruption index and
12the growth rate of per capita GDP is very low and not statistically significant. If we
regress the ICRG on a constant and the growth rate, the coefficient on the growth rate
is -0.0098, with a p-value of 0.1  10.4 Although this evidence indicates that the indices
seem to be a reasonable measure of corruption, it is important to keep in mind their
potential limitations when interpreting  the results.
Besides this measurement problem, there is an issue of how to interpret the
indices themselves. Is the ordering of countries the only real meaning of the indices,
or is there some cardinal value attached to them? The question can be rephrased as
follows: if all countries achieve a low level of corruption, will all of them be assigned
the same value, or will different values yielding a raking of countries still be used?
We try  to keep these issues in mind when choosing the estimation strategies and
interpreting the results.
From the indices discussed in Table 2, the analysis will concentrate on the
ICRG, which is the only one covering a reasonable time span (from 1984 to 1999 in
our data set). Even though the time variation in the corruption index tends to be small,
the  period of  the  sample includes significant regime  changes in  some  political
systems - Latin America and Eastern Europe for example - that can help us identify
the effects of the variables of interest. The use of a panel to analyze the determinants
of corruption is another original contribution of this work. Our corruption variable
(corruption) is constructed directly from the ICRG index, and varies discretely from 0
to 6, with higher values indicating more corruption.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
The theoretical background that guides the estimation is an economy where
the political institutions are given, and, within this structure, policy and economic
decisions are made. The institutional design of the political system is the ultimate
determinant  of  corruption,  because  it  shapes  the  incentives  facing  government
officials. Our set of core variables is related to these factors and tries to capture the
4  If country fixed effects are included, or lagged values of the growth rate are used, the same result
holds. If we estimate the relation using an ordered probit, the p-value is slightly lower (0.086), but the
coefficient remains quantitatively small. These results should not be  interpreted  as evidence that
corruption does not matter for economic development, because they do not provide estimates of the
true partial correlation.
13main  political  issues discussed in  section 2.2. To  this  set  of  variables,  we  add
sequentially controls that try  to  account  for the effects of factors that  might be
correlated with both political institutions and corruption.
The first  set  of additional control variables includes factors exogenous to
political structure and  corruption that might simultaneously determine both. These
factors  could  generate  a  spurious  correlation  between  corruption  and  political
institutions that we would interpret as a causal relationship, if we did not take them
into account. What we have in mind here are the popular accounts of corruption as
being largely determined by culture, traditions, etc. In principle, these cultural aspects
- related to  natural  characteristics, climate, region, and  colonial heritage - may
determine both the prevalence of corruption and the political institutions in a given
society. If this  is the case, the popular view that certain people and  cultures are
intrinsically more corrupt is correct.
The other set  of  controls tries to  account for  the fact that  policy  is  not
determined exclusively by political structure, and different policy choices may end up
having independent effects on corruption. This is clearly the case in relation to public
wages and  trade policies, which  have direct  effects on the costs and  benefits of
engaging in corrupt activities. These factors have been analyzed elsewhere - see Van
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) on public wages, and Ades and di Tella (1994) and
Laffont and N'Guessan  (1999) on openness and competitiveness - but we introduce
them in  our empirical analysis as additional controls for possible determinants of
corruption that may be correlated with political institutions. This is also the case for
the size of the government and the distribution of resources across the different levels
of government, which can be seen as affecting the total amount and centralization of
the rents that tempt public officials.
Finally, there  is the possibility that corruption control is simply a  normal
good, in the sense that when countries develop, corruption naturally falls. If certain
political institutions are correlated with development, this could bias the results by
assigning to  political institutions effects that are actually caused by development
alone.
14We classify these three sets of controls as, respectively, cultural, policy, and
development controls. In the estimation, we include first the cultural controls, which
represent structural factors, as country-group common effects. 5 In turn, we include
separately the policy and development controls, and analyze whether and how the
results concerning the main variables of interest change. The empirical specification
is discussed in section 4.1.
3.3 Variables
Political Variables
With the exception of freedom of press, the political variables used here are
constructed from  the data contained in  Beck et al (2001). This  study presents a
database covering several countries in the period between 1975 and 1999.
The  political  variables  are  defined  in  the  following way  (more precise
definitions  of  all  the  variables  discussed in  this  section  are  contained  in  the
Appendix):
- Democracy (democ): dummy variable with value 1 if the country is democratic;
- Presidential democracy (presid): dummy variable with value  I  if the country is
democratic and has a presidential system;
- Reelection (reelect): dummy variable with value 1 if the country is a presidential
democracy and head of the executive can run for multiple terms;
-Democratic stability (dstab): time of uninterrupted democratic regime;
- Closed lists (lists): dummy variable assuming value 1 if country is democratic and
there are closed lists in the election of the legislature;
- State government (state):  variable assuming value 0 if there are no local government
elections, value 1 if state legislature is locally elected but the executive is not, and
value 2 if both legislature and executive are locally elected;
- Executive control (control): dummy variable with value 1 if executive's party has
control of all relevant chambers of the legislature; and
5 A lot of the variation in political variables comes from cross-country differences, so we opted not to
include fixed effects in the analysis.
15- Freedom of  press (press):  constructed from the  freedom of  press index  from
Freedom  House,  with  values  ranging  between  0  and  100 (with  higher  values
indicating more freedom).
Some of these variables are defined as subgroups of others. So, for example,
presidential system actually identifies the presence of a presidential system within a
democracy, or reelection is measuring the possibility of executive reelection within a
presidential democracy. The effect of these variables has, thus, to be interpreted as
conditional on the effect of the preceding one, as in "the effect of presidential system,
given that the country is democratic", and so on. This structure derives from our view
of the sequence of relevant choices in terms of political institutions. This view  is
illustrated in the decision tree in Figure 1.
The variables democracy, reelection, and closed lists try to capture features of
the political system associated with electoral competition and the strength of political
parties, which tend to make elections a more effective instrument for distributing
political rewards. Democracy is the most basic measure of electoral competition, and
both reelections and closed lists are institutions that tend to increase the horizon of
politicians, thus increasing accountability. Reelections have a straightforward effect
in  this  direction, while  closed  lists  make  parties  stronger, which  in  turn  bias
politicians toward long term goals and increase the concerns about reputation. In
other words, the use of  closed lists  in legislative elections creates incentives for
individual politicians to worry about the reputation of the party as a whole, and thus
we expect lists to  have a corruption reducing effect (Linz, 1990; Linz and  Stepa,
1996; Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Garman et al, 2001).
Presidential system, executive control of houses, and democratic stability are
variables determining the presence of checks and balances mechanisms in the system.
Presidential  systems  and  executive  control  of  the  legislative  houses  make  the
executive more  independent and  less subject to  checks from  other powers, thus
reducing accountability. Time of democratic stability allows for institutional learning
and  development of  checks and balances  mechanisms adequate to  the  particular
culture and political tradition, thus increasing accountability, besides giving time for
other political institutions to have its effects completely felt (Linz, 1990; Linz and
16Stepa,  1996;  Tirole,  1996;  Bailey  and  Valenzuela,  1997;  Rose-Ackerman,  1999;
Garman et al, 2001).
Figure  1: Political Tree
Choice  of System
Democracy  Autocracy
Parliamentary  Presidential
Reelection  No Reelection
Closed  Lists  No Closed  Lists
Choices  Regarding  State/Local  Elections  and Freedom  of Press
Freedom  of  press  captures  the  transparency  of  the  system.  By  increasing
transparency,  freedom  of  press  reduces  the  informational  problem  in  the  political
system, and increases  accountability  (Peters and Welch,  1980; Fackler  and Lin,  1995;
Giglioli,  1996; and Djankiv  et al, 2001).
State autonomy  tries  to capture the decentralization  of the political  system. As
mentioned,  decentralization  affects  several  different  aspects  of the  political  system.
First,  decentralization  tends  to  increase  accountability  via  easier  monitoring  of
governments  at  the  local  level.  Second,  decentralization  affects  the  structure  of
17provision of public goods, possibly simultaneously increasing the competition among
states and establishing overlapping bureaucracies from local and central governments.
These two forces have opposite effects on corruption, and which one predominates is
an empirical matter (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Weingast, 1995; Nas et al, 1996; and
Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and Ahlin, 2001).
These are the political variables that try to  capture the aspects of political
institutions discussed in section 2.2. They constitute our main interest and the core
variables in our empirical investigation.
Control Variables
As mentioned, our control variables are classified into three groups: cultural,
policy,  and  development controls. The  cultural  controls  include a  large  set  of
variables related to climate, region, and ethnic characteristics of the countries. The
goal is to include a set of human and geographic variables as broad as possible, to
account  for  all  the  possible  determinants of  cultural traditions  that  may  affect
simultaneously political institutions and the incidence of corruption. The variables
chosen are the following:
- Variables for  natural  conditions: region dummies  (reg_*); landlocked country
dummy (landlock); longitude and latitude position of the country (longit and latit);
size of the country (area); tropical area dummy (tropic); and British legal tradition
dummy (leg_brit); all  these variables are taken  from the  World Bank's  Global
Development  Network Growth Database; and
- Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (elf): index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization,
from Collier and Hoefler (1998).
These variables try to capture natural factors that may directly or indirectly
affect  a  country's  traditions,  determining, for  example, its  "intrinsic" propensity
towards openness (landlock), or its colonization history (tropical, leg_brit, longit, and
latit). Additionally, other aspects of the country's history that may affect its human
and cultural compositions are considered, via its legal tradition and ethno-linguistic
fractionalization.
18The policy controls concentrate on government wages, openness, and size and
composition of the government. These variables are represented by the following
series:
- Relative  government  wages  (wages):  government  wages  in  relation  to
manufacturing sector wages, from Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001);
- Economic openness (open): imports as a share of GDP, from the World Bank's
World Development Indicators;
- Size of the government (govrev): total government revenue as a share of the GDP,
from the IMF's Government  Financial Statistics; and
- Expenditures decentralization (transfi: transfers from central government to other
levels of national government, as percentage of GDP, from the IMF's  Government
Financial Statistics.
These variables try to control for aspects that elsewhere have been found to
affect corruption, such as  government wages and openness, and for the size and
composition of the rents available for extraction (Ades and di Tella, 1994; Laffont
and N'Guessan, 1999; Treisman, 2000; and Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).
The last set of control variables is related to development, and tries to capture
unspecified dimensions of  development that  may  directly affect  corruption. We
choose income and education measures as indicators of development levels. They are
defined as follows:
- Income (lngdp): natural logarithm of the per capita GDP (PPP adjusted), from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators; and
-Education (tyrl5): average schooling in the population above 15, from the Barro and
Lee dataset.
19Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable  N Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
corruption  2082  2.67  1.40  0  6
democ  2486  0.49  0.50  0  1
presid  2490  0.21  0.41  0  1
reelect  2490  0.14  0.34  0  1
dstab  2275  12.66  19.63  0  68
state  1863  0.75  0.83  0  2
list  2367  0.22  0.41  0  1
control  2439  0.73  0.44  0  1
press  2237  51.74  24.78  0  95
wages  436  1.12  0.52  0.10  6.06
open  2183  40.18  24.80  1.35  199.82
govrev  1217  26.43  11.07  0.03  81.54
transf  1214  3.30  3.21  0  17.13
reg_eap  2766  0.14  0.34  0  1
reg_eca  2766  0.15  0.36  0  1
Reg_mena  2766  0.12  0.33  0  1
reg_sa  2766  0.05  0.21  0  1
reg_ssa  2766  0.27  0.44  0  1
reglac  2766  0.17  0.37  0  1
landlock  2766  0.21  0.41  0  1
longit  2606  18.45  63.91  -172.43  177.97
latit  2606  17.56  24.03  -36.89  63.89
area  2606  178377  233792  105  977956
leg_brit  2622  0.32  0.47  0  1
tropic  2766  0.51  0.50  0  1
elf  1968  41.89  29.45  0  93
Ingdp  2162  8.17  1.09  5.77  10.42
tyrl5  913  6.04  2.54  0.90  11.94
Notes: Variables  defined in section 3.3, and explained  in detail in the Appendix.  All
observations  available  in the period  1984-99  used  in  the calculations.  Region  dummies  refer  to:
East Asia and Pacific,  East Europe  and Central  Asia,  Middle  East and North Africa,  South
Asia,  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  and  Latin  America  and  Caribbean.
Descriptive Summary of the Data
Table 3 presents summary statistics of all the variables discussed above. Table
4 decomposes the standard deviations into within and between components, for those
variables that  change across  countries and time.  The variables  related to  ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (elj) and freedom of press (press) are country specific in
our sample due to data limitations.
20Table 4: Between and Within Variation in the Data
Variable  N Countries  Std. Dev. of Country  Mean of Country Std.  (1)/(2)
Means (Between)  Deviations (Within)  (Btw/Wth)
(1)  (2)
corruption  146  1.20  0.52  2.30
democ  179  0.41  0.20  2.09
presid  179  0.33  0.15  2.26
reelect  179  0.26  0.13  2.02
dstab  179  18.76  2.39  7.86
state  157  0.80  0.07  11.58
list  178  0.37  0.08  4.66
control  178  0.39  0.11  3.53
wages  62  0.46  0.14  3.32
open  164  23.28  7.42  3.14
govrev  112  10.78  2.77  3.89
transf  102  2.84  0.89  3.21
lngdp  154  1.06  0.20  5.33
tyrI5  83  2.54  0.28  9.14
Notes: Variables defined in section 3.3, and explained in detailed in the Appendix. All observations available in the
period 1984-99  used in the calculations.
Despite the usual claim that corruption does not vary at all within a country,
Table 4 shows that the ratio of between to within variation for the corruption index is
actually lower than the same ratio for most of the explanatory variables, besides the
political variables. Although this is probably caused partly by the discrete and limited
nature of the variable itself, it shows that there is some time variation to be explored
in the corruption index. Figure 2 illustrates this point by plotting the evolution of the
corruption index through time by  regions of the  world (simple averages for  the
countries belonging to the respective region). Although there seems to be some co-
movements of the series across the different regions, there are also some independent
patterns. For example, as Latin America and South Asia experienced a decline in
corruption since the late 80's,  Western Europe and North America experienced a
slight increase during the same period. Hence, the time dimension of the data seems
to present enough variation to justify its exploration.
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We also try  to  summarize here the simple pair-wise relation between the
corruption index and the main explanatory variables. For the dichotomous political
variables, Table 5 presents the mean of the corruption index for mutually exclusive
categories, and  indicates for  which  cases  the  difference between  the  means  is
statistically significant.
The  simple difference in means goes generally in  the expected direction:
democracy, the possibility of reelection,  and the existence of  local  elections are
associated with lower corruption, while presidential system and government control
of all  houses are associated with  higher corruption than  their respective control
groups. Closed lists do not appear to be significantly correlated with corruption.
Table 6 presents the correlation of the other main explanatory variables with
the corruption index. Most of the correlations also have the expected sign: democratic
stability, freedom of press, relative wages in the public sector, economic openness,
transfers from central to other levels of government, income level, and education are
associated with lower corruption, while ethno-linguistic fractionalization is associated
with higher corruption. The correlation between government revenues as a share of
22GDP  and  corruption  is  surprisingly negative and  significant. Some  endogenous
response of government expenditures to the level of corruption is probably at work
here, so that less corrupt governments end up having higher revenues as a share of
GDP.
Table 5: Mean of the Corruption Index across Different Political Institutions
Group  N Obs  Mean  Std. Err.
democ*  0  802  3.25  0.0409
1  972  2.11  0.0447
presid*  0  538  1.58  0.0613
1  434  2.76  0.0497
reelect*  0  197  2.97  0.0681
1  238  2.58  0.0689
state*  0  543  3.01  0.0619
1  801  2.03  0.0452
control*  0  543  1.72  0.0595
1  1200  3.02  0.0358
list  0  435  1.98  0.0693
1  468  2.09  0.0629
Notes: *  - Difference between group means is statistically significant at 1%.
Value I indicates that the observation is included in the respective categoTy.
For presidential system and closed lists, averages calculated only on the sub-
sample of democratic countries. For reelection, averages calculated only on
the sub-sample of presidential democratic countries. For state elections, group
I defined as to include groups 1 and 2 defined  before.
Table 6: Correlation between Corruption Index and Explanatory Variables
Variable  Correlation with  N Obs
Corruption  Index
dstab  -0.6465*  1752
press  -0.5727*  1711
wages  -0.2335*  369
open  -0.0977*  1670
govrev  -0.4820*  1035
transf  -0.4215*  697
elf  0.3235*  1705
Ingdp  -0.5991*  1624
tyrl5  -0.6471*  835
Notes: *  - Significant at  1%. Correlations calculated
using pooled data.
The political variables time of democratic stability and freedom of press are
very strongly related to corruption in the pooled data. This is also true for the simple
cross sectional relation based on country averages. Figures 3 and 4 plot the within
country averages of dstab and press against the within country average of corruption,
23and fits a  linear regression to each of these cross-sectional relations. The negative
correlations between these two variables and corruption are clear.
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At  a superficial level, most of the selected variables have a  relation with
corruption that  is  similar to  what  is theoretically plausible. Accountability has  a
strong negative correlation with corruption, which suggests that political variables
may be in fact important in determining the prevalence of corruption. Whether this is
a causal relationship or a spurious correlation is the question that we try to address in
the remaining sections of the paper. In what follows, we discuss the specification
adopted in our multivariate analysis of the political determinants of corruption, and
discuss the results.
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4 Specification and Results
4.1 Specification
The  ICRG  corruption  index varies  discretely between  0  and  6.  Strictly
speaking, it cannot be treated as a continuous  variable. With this in mind, we estimate
the model using ordered probit and simple OLS techniques, following the approach of
Dull (1999). The ordered probit allows for a dependent variable in which the actual
values are irrelevant, except that higher values correspond to higher outcomes. Given
that the precise meaning of the cardinal values in the corruption index is unclear, this
is another feature of this class of models that is adequate for our purposes (for details
on ordered probit models, see Maddala, 1983).
25Table 7: Results: Corruption  Regressions
Ordered  Probit  OLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
democ  -0.1580  -0.5238  -1.8054  -0.7097  -0.2078  -0.4598  -1.2111  -0.6140
0.1302  0,1547  0.3149  0.2368  0.1195  0.1227  0.2009  0.1870
0.2250  0.0010  0.0000  0.0030  0.0820  0.0000  0.0000  0.0010
presid  1.0367  0.4324  1.2732  1.1194  0.9261  0.3591  0.7589  0.8403
0.1030  0.2028  0.3340  0.2710  0.0907  0.1679  0.2237  0.2150
0.0000  0.0330  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0330  0.0010  0.0000
reelect  -0.2244  0.0429  -0.3354  -0.3062  -0.2329  0.0385  -0.1668  -0.2676
0.1375  0.1810  0.2929  0.2609  0.1254  0.1477  0.2153  0.2149
0.1030  0.8130  0.2520  0,2410  0.0630  0.7940  0.4390  0.2140
dstab  -0.0340  -0.0423  -0.0410  -0.0453  -0.0272  -0.0307  -0.0234  -0.0284
0.0024  0.0032  0.0055  0.0049  0.0019  0.0022  0.0033  0.0035
0,0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
state  -0.0968  0.1525  0.4359  0.1625  -0.1039  0.0828  0.1693  0.0759
0.0425  0.0543  0.1015  0.0768  0.0370  0.0407  0.0618  0.0557
0.0230  0.0050  0.0000  0.0340  0.0050  0.0420  0.0060  0.1730
list  -0.1654  0.0426  -0.0817  0.3171  -0.1553  -0.0018  -0.0501  0.1937
0.0860  0.1035  0.1733  0.1472  0.0683  0.0689  0.0904  0.0909
0.0550  0.6810  0.6370  0.0310  0.0230  0.9790  0.5800  0.0330
control  0.1628  -0.0574  -0.4270  -0.1001  0.1419  -0.0413  -0.3092  -0.0667
0.0955  0.1068  0.1864  0.1429  0.0825  0.0808  0.1112  0.1028
0.0880  0.5910  0.0220  0.4830  0.0860  0.6090  0.0060  0.5170
press  -0.0113  -0.0056  -0.0210  -0.0014  -0.0099  -0.0043  -0.0152  -0.0006
0.0022  0.0031  0.0061  0.0043  0.0020  0.0024  0.0042  0.0033
0.0000  0.0690  0.0010  0.7500  0.0000  0.0740  0.0000  0.8500
govrev  0.0389  0.0239
0.0098  0.0065
0.0000  0.0000
transf  -0.0632  -0.0184
0.0221  0.0110
0.0040  0.0950
open  0.0000  -0.0015
0.0030  0.0019
0.9930  0.4510
lngdp  -0.1826  -0.1940
0.1412  0.1056
0.1960  0.0670
tyrS5  -0.1090  -0.0469
0.0443  0.0304
0.0140  0.1230
leg  brit  0.2598  0.3293  0.6279  0.1518  0.1735  0.3470
0.1122  0.2510  0.1672  0.0844  0.1485  0.1216
0.0210  0.1900  0.0000  0.0730  0.2430  0.0040
elf  0.0123  0.0210  0.0109  0.0100  0.0132  0.0103
0.0021  0.0040  0.0029  0.0016  0.0024  0.0020
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
period dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
reg/nature vars  no  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  yes
N Obs  1158  1010  490  605  1158  1010  490  605
Pseudo R2/R 2 0.24  0.33  0.45  0.38  0.57  0.70  0.79  0.74
Obs.: Std errors and p-values below coefficients. Dep var is ICRG corruption index, (0 to 6, higher values more corruption). Ind
vars are (d for dummy): democracy d, presidential d, possibility of reelection d, time of democratic stability, indicator of local
elections for state govs, gov control of legislative d, freedom of press index, gov revenues (% GDP), transfers from central  gov
to other levels (% GDP), openness to trade (imports as % GDP), In of per capita GDP, avg schooling in the pop above 15, British
legal tradition d, index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, period d's, region d's (E Asia and Pacif, E Eur and C Asia, M East
and N Afr, S Asia, Sub-Saharan Afr, and L Am and Carib), and nature variables (landlock d, area, tropical d, long, and lat).
govrev, transf, open, Ingdp, and tyrl15  lagged. Regressions  include all obs available  between 1984-97. Robust std errors used.
26As discussed  in se tion 3.2, four different  specifications  are adopted,  to check
the  robustness  of  the  results  to  different  alternative  hypotheses.  In  brief,  the  first
equation  contains  only the  core variables,  the  second  specification  contains  the  core
variables  and the cultural controls, the third  specification adds the policy  controls,  and
the  last  specification  substitutes  the  development  for  the  policy  controls.  In  all
specifications,  dummy  variables  for  different  sub-periods  of the sample  are  included
(1987-90,  1991-94,  and  1995-97),  to account  for possible spurious  co-movements  of
the  corruption  index  across  countries.  Also,  the  economic  variables  (govrev,  transf
open, lngdp,  and tvrl 5) are included  with a lag of one period,  to account for potential
problems  of endogeneity.
Table  7 presents  the results  of the regressions.  Columns  (1) to (4) present  the
different  specifications  mentioned  above  for  the ordered  probit  model,  and  columns
(5) to (8) present  the same specifications  for the OLS estimates.  Since the qualitative
results  are  virtually  the  same  across  the  ordered  probit  and  OLS  estimates,  we
concentrate  our  discussion  on  the  OLS  results,  which  provide  a  more  intuitive
interpretation  of the  coefficients.  The variable  relative  to government  wages  (wvages)
is  not  presented  in the  table  above  because  it enormously  reduces  the  sample,  but
likewise,  we  discuss  its  effect  on  the  estimates.  The  following  discussion  also




Table 7 shows that the most consistent  results  regarding the political  variables
are  related  to  democracy,  presidential  systems,  time  of  democratic  stability.  and
freedom  of press. The estimated coefficients  in columns (4) to (8) imply  the following
relations  between  these  variables  and  perceived  corruption:  democracy  reduces
corruption  by  0.7  points;  presidential  systems  in  a  democracy,  as  opposed  to
parliamentary  systems,  increase  corruption  by  0.8 points;  each additional  20  years ol
27uninterrupted democracy reduce corruption by 0.5 points; and 50 points more in the
freedom of press  index (as from the  level of Turkey to  the level  of the United
Kingdom) reduces corruption by 0.5 points. These main results are robust to the
inclusion of the government wages variable in the right hand side, which typically
reduces the sample to less than 200 observations.
Using a common yardstick to translate these results into comparable units, and
looking at the average values of the coefficients in Table  7, we have that a one
standard deviation increase in the democracy variable, or a one standard deviation
reduction  in  the  presidential systems variable, reduces the  corruption index  by
approximately 0.3.  A one  standard deviation increase  in the time  of  democratic
stability reduces the corruption index by 0.54, while a one standard deviation increase
in the freedom of press index reduces it by 0. 19. If we restrict ourselves to the within
country variation in these variables, which probably gives a more accurate picture of
the extent of political changes typically happening in the short run, a one (within
country) standard deviation increase in these variables has the following effect on the
corruption  index:  a  reduction  of  0.12  for  democracy, an  increase  of  0.11  for
presidential systems, and a reduction of 0.07 for democratic stability. Overall, time of
democratic stability seems  to be  the variable with the  most  important effect  on
corruption, although if  we  look only  at within country changes, democracy and
presidential systems become more important.
The effects of presidential system and democratic stability are reasonably
stable across all specifications. The effect of democracy starts being insignificant in
the simplest specification, and only becomes significant once controls are introduced.
There seems to  be  cultural factors that determine simultaneously democracy and
corruption, but democracy alone, once these natural factors are accounted for, reduces
corruption. With freedom of press, the case is  the opposite. Freedom of press is
significantly related to  less  corruption in  the  first  three  specifications, but  once
economic development is taken into account, its effect falls to close to zero, and is not
28statistically significant anymore. 6 The results suggest that freedom of press may be
actually capturing the effect of economic  development on corruption.
Also worthy of note, but apparently less strong than the previous results, is the
effect  of  local  government  autonomy.  It  starts  being  negative  and  borderline
significant in the simplest specification, and becomes positive and significant (for
most  of the cases) as additional controls are introduced. This means that cultural
factors correlated with decentralization are also correlated with less corruption: the
simple correlation between corruption and state autonomy is negative, but once these
cultural factors are accounted for, the independent effect of decentralization becomes
positive. This suggests that the congestion of different bureaucracies regulating the
same activities dominates the other potential effects of decentralization. However,
this result has to be interpreted with caution, because it is partly due to changes in the
sample. If we run the simplest specification in the smaller samples used in columns
(6)  to  (8),  the effect  of  state  autonomy becomes  positive, although statistically
significant in only one of the cases.
Control Variables
As  expected, size of the government (govrev) increases corruption, while
distribution of  resources from the  central government to  other levels of national
government (trans]) reduces corruption. This last effect may be associated with the
fact that monitoring at the local level is easier than at the central level, so that more
resources used by  local government translates into more resources falling  under
closer control by  citizens. Together with the state autonomy variable (state), this
variable may be decomposing different dimensions of decentralization: while state
captures the  autonomy of the  state to  interfere on  spheres already  being partly
legislated  by  the  central  government  (which  might  increase  inefficiency  and
corruption), transf captures the distribution of a given amount of resources between
central  and  local  governments (which  might  increase  accountability and  reduce
corruption).
6 The behavior of the democracy and freedom of press coefficients is not due to changes in the sample
when new variables are included. They still hold when the different specifications are run  with the
same restricted sample.
29The effects of economic openness and British legal tradition do not agree with
commonplace results from the previous literature. Openness has no significant effect
here, while it was found to reduce corruption in Ades and di Tella (1994) and Laffont
and  N'Guessan  (1999). This  difference is  not  spuriously generated by  different
samples or  statistics used:  if we omit the political variables from our regression,
openness does show up as having a negative and significant effect on corruption.
The negative effect of British legal tradition on corruption, which is one of the
main results in Treisman (2000) via the variable history of British colonization, is
also absent here: British legal tradition usually appears as having a  positive and
significant effect in our regressions. Again, this is not due to differences in the data
used: if we omit the political variables from our regression, British legal tradition
does show up as having a negative and significant effect on corruption.
In our view, these differences come from the distinct conceptual and empirical
approaches that  we  adopted. Political institutions are the  main  exogenous force
shaping  the  incentive  structure  that  determines  both  corruption  and  the
implementation of specific policies. Thus, in our sample, openness is correlated with
democracy, parliamentary systems, freedom of press, and absence of corruption, but
the political variables seem to be determining openness and corruption, rather than
the other way around. In the vast majority of cases, political variables seem to be
clearly more exogenous than trade policies.
Also, rather than having a direct negative effect on corruption, British legal
tradition is  strongly associated with  democracy, stability, freedom of  press, and
parliamentary systems, and these political variables tend to reduce corruption. 7 Thus,
once the political system is taken into account, the culture associated with the British
legal tradition by itself seems in fact to  increase corruption. Analyzed alone, the
informality of the British law, where practices are strongly based on unwritten rules,
Both openness  and  British  legal  tradition  are significantly  correlated  to the abovementioned  political
variables.  For all cases mentioned,  pair-wise  correlations  are statistically  significant  at 1%,  apart from
freedom  of press, for which  correlations  are smaller  and only significant  at the 5% level.
30seems to be more subject to corruption than other traditions, where rules are explicitly
defined. Therefore, our result should not be surprising. 8 9
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the link between political institutions and corruption. We
show that the behavior of corruption is very distinct from the behavior of common
crimes, and argue that this indicates the relevance of explanatory variables that are
unique to corruption. These factors are mainly associated with the environment in
which relations between individuals and the state take place. Political institutions, by
determining this environment, are extremely important in determining the incidence
of  corruption.  Ultimately, the  political  macrostructure - related to  the  political
system, balance of powers, electoral competitiveness, and so on - determines the
incentives for those in office to be honest, and to police and punish misbehavior of
others, such that the effects are propagated throughout the system to the lower levels
of government.
We analyze the  available data  on  corruption, and  argue that,  despite its
limitations, the evidence suggests that  it measures something close to perceived
corruption. The empirical analysis using panel data based on the ICRG corruption
index indicates that  corruption tends  to  decrease systematically with  democracy,
8 Similar results are obtained when government relative wages are included in the regression. With a
more  extended  set of "structural" independent variables, the effect of wages  tends to be insignificant,
although even positive significant results sometimes emerge. When the political variables are excluded
from the regression, the effect of government wages becomes negative and borderline significant. But
in this case, due to the limited number of observations on wages,  it is difficult to tell how much of the
result comes from the change in the sample, and how much comes precisely from the inclusion of
different sets of independent variables. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, all the main results on the
core variables survive to the inclusion of wages  in the regression. For this reason, and because of the
instability of this coefficient across different specifications, we omit the regressions including wages  in
Table 7.
9  In relation to the regional dummies, the most consistent results across the different specifications
refer to "East Europe and Central Asia" and "Latin America and the Caribbean." Both these regions
have  higher level  of perceived corruption than would be  expected from  the  values of  the  other
independent variables. The estimated coefficients imply that, for constant values of the other variables,
"East Europe and  Central Asia"  and "Latin  America and  the Caribbean" have corruption indices
approximately I point higher than the control group (West Europe and North America). There seems to
be some truth to the popular belief that these places of the world have a particularly acute problem of
corruption.
31parliamentary systems, political  stability, and  freedom of  press. We  control  for
different sets of variables that may determine simultaneously  political institutions and
corruption, or that may be correlated with both. These controls include a large set of
cultural and natural factors (from region and climate, to legal tradition and ethnic
composition), a set of policy variables, and development variables. The inclusion of
such a large set of controls is possible due to the unprecedented use of a panel in this
type of analysis. Of the results mentioned before, all but the one related to freedom of
press survive the inclusion of the different sets of controls. Freedom of press seems to
be partially capturing the effect of economic development on corruption.
Another effect suggested by the empirical analysis, but  that needs  further
investigation to be confirmed, is the one related to decentralization. In accordance
with the theoretical literature, the analysis hints at the fact that different types of
decentralization may have different effects on corruption. Political decentralization in
the sense that states are more autonomous, potentially being able to legislate over
areas already covered by the central government, seems to increase corruption, while
decentralization in the sense that  expenditures are more decentralized through the
different levels of national government seems to reduce corruption.
The  inclusion  of  political  variables  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  the
determinants of corruption turns out to be refreshing. Justifying all the attention given
by the theoretical literature to the institutional determinants of corruption (referenced
in section 2.2), our results indicate that political variables are indeed among the most
important determinants of corruption across countries and over time. After political
institutions are accounted for, variables usually found to be important determinants of
corruption - such as openness, wages i;l the public sector, and legal tradition - loose
virtually all their relevance. These results are robust to controls for regions of the
world, natural characteristics, economic development, ethnic composition, etc. In a
nutshell, political institutions really matter because they establish the monitoring and
accountability mechanisms, which in  turn reduce the incentives for corruption by
public servants.
From  a  policy  viewpoint,  this  study should  raise  the  attention  given to
accountability mechanisms  more  generally. For  example,  future  research  could
32explore whether agencies subject to different accountability mechanisms (such as
transparency standards) within a given country also differ in terms of the corruption
they engender. Moreover, discussions of political decentralization should bear in
mind the distinct effects that different forms of decentralization might have. Efforts
should be targeted at  creating competition in  all levels of the political structure,
avoiding  regulations  in  which  different agencies - or  levels  of  power - have
overlapping jurisdictions. Finally, although the effect of freedom of press in our data
might  be  the  product  of  development, this  finding  should not  deter  efforts  to
strengthen the ability of civil society to monitor the performance of the public sector.
Nevertheless, the results do indicate that political institutions matter, and that
some political systems are likely to be associated with lower levels of corruption over
time. Thus, anti-corruption efforts to be undertaken are likely to succeed more readily
in some systems than in others.
33Appendix:  Data
Name  Variable  Source  Description
Corruption
CRR-DRI  Corrluption  Standard  and Poor's  Corruption among public officials,  effectiveness of anticorruption  initiatives.
DRI'McGraw-Hill  Based oni  country analysts'  oinion.  Detailed  in Kaufmani  et al (19991
GALLUP  Corruption  Gallup International  Frequency of "cases of corruption"  among public officials.  Based on survey of
. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~citizens.  Detailed  in  Kaufmran  et a] (1999).
GCSI  Corruiption  Global Competitiveness  Irregular, additional payments  connected with import and export permits,
Survey  business licenises,  excliange  controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan
applicatioiis.  Based  on  survey  of  enterprises.  Detailed  in Kaufman  et al (  1999).
GCS2  Corrtiption  Global Competitiveniess  Frequency of "irregular  payments" to officials and  judiciary. Based on survey of
Survey  enterprises. Detailed in Kaufman et al (1999).
ICRG  Corrtiption  Intemational Country Risk  Indicator related to financial risk associated  with this factor based on the
._______  __________________  Guide  anialysis  of worldwide network of experts. Detailed  in ICRG (1999).
WDR  Corruption  World Development  Report  Corruptiols  as "obstacle to bissiness". Based on firms' survey. Detailed in
1997,  Kaufman et a[ (1999).
Political
control  Executive Control of  Beck et al (2001)  Duinmy indicating whetlier executive  has control of all houses.
Legislative Houses
democ  Democracy  Beck et al (2001)  Dtimmy for a regime with democratic  characteristics, not run by a military
of  ficer.
dstab  Tine  of Democratic  Beck et al (2001)  Years of democratic stability
Stability
list  Closed Lists  Beck et al (2001)  Dummy for existence of closed lists in a democratic  regime.
presid  Presidential System  Beck et al (2001)  Dummy foT  a presidential  democracy.
reelect  Reelection  Beck et al (2001)  Dummy  for possibility of reelectioni  in a presidential  democracy.
state  State Autonomy  Beck et al (2001)  Variable indicating the degree  of state political autonomy  (0 if there are no local
elections,  I if legislature is locally elected, atid 2 if botli legislature attd
_  =______  _executive  are locally elected).
Controls
area  Area  World  Basik  Global  Counitry  area in square km's.
Development  Network
Growth Database
elf  Ethno-liiguiistic  Collier and Hoeffler  (1998)  Ettsno-linguistic  Fractionalization Index: probability  that any two random
Fractionalization  citizens will be drawn fromn  different ethno-linguistic grouns.
frpress  Freepress index  Freedom  House  Freedom of press itidex obtained from the HDI. Based oti academic advisors, in-
_  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~house  experts,  publications,  and  local  correspondents.
gdppc  lincomc  World Development  GDP per capita, PPP (current international $).
Indicators
govrev  Size of the Government IMF Finanicial  Government  Total government revenue as % of GDP.
Statistics
[landlock  Latsdlocked  World Bank Global  Dummy for landlocked  countries.
Development  Network
Growth Database
latitu[de  Latitide  World Bank Global  Country latittide  in degrees.
Development  Network
Growth Database
leg brith  British Legal Tradition  World Bank Global  Dummy for British legal tradition.
Development  Network
Growth Database
longitude  Lonigitude  World Bank Global  Coulitry latitude in degrees.
Development  NetwoTk
Growth Database
open  Frade  Openness  World  Development  Imports as share of GDP.
tndicators
reg_'  Regionis  World  Bank Global  Dtimmies for regions of thie  world.
Development  Network
Growth Database
tranisf  Expeniditure  IMF Financial Governiment  Transfers from central government to other levels of national government as %
'Decentralization  Statistics  of GDP.
tropic  Tropical Climate  World Bank  Global  Dummy for tropical countries (absolute  value of latitude less than or equal to
Development  Network  23).
Growth Database
trI  5  Education  Barro and Lee  Average Schooling in the population above 15.
wages  Relative Government  Van Rijckeghem  and Weder  Government wages relative to manifacturing wages.
Wages  (2001) and ILO
Crime
burglary  Buirglary  Rate  Itrternational  Crime  Percentage of the population  victim of burglaries.
Victimization SLurveys
theft  Theft Rate  International  Crime  Percentage of the population  victim of thefts.
Victimization Surveys
coit. crine Cotitact Crimes Rate  International  Crime  Percentage  of the population  victim of contact crimes.
Victimization Surveys
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